The Gulf War:
Overreaction & Excessiveness
By Hassan A El-Najjar
Amazone Press, 2001
The Root of Subsequent US Invasion of the Middle East
America was dragged into conflict
with the Arab and Muslim worlds
THE 1990 CRISIS
LEADING TO THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
The 1990 crisis that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was
the fifth in the relations between the two Arab states. In 1896,
Mubarak Al-Sabah usurped office and became the ruler of Kuwait after
killing his two brothers, Muhammed and Jarrah. To protect himself from
their children and followers, who took refuge in Basra, he signed a
protection agreement with Britain in 1899. His nephews, backed by
Iraqi authorities and other supporters, launched two attempts to
restore Kuwait in 1901 and 1902. Although they failed, successive
Iraqi governments have never approved of the British arrangements,
particularly the protection agreement, that led to the secession of
Kuwait from Iraq. Tensions resurfaced for the third time in the 1930s,
with a climax in 1938, when King Ghazi of Iraq led a media campaign
against the Shaikh of Kuwait, Ahmed Al-Jaber. He also criticized the
British imperialist policies that led to the dismemberment of the Arab
nation and obstructed unification. The fourth crisis between the two
states followed termination of the protection agreement on June 19,
1961. Four days later, Iraq announced its intentions to annex Kuwait.
In all these four crises, Britain was there to protect Kuwait and
supporting its independence (Chapter I).
The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was
the climax of the fifth crisis between the two neighborly Arab states.
However, it was the most violent of these crises resulting in the most
serious consequences for both of them. This chapter attempts to
explain how the fifth crisis developed. This is followed by an
analysis for the major factors that intensified the crisis to reach
the war stage. A special attention is paid to the Iraqi-Israeli
relations, which contributed to the escalation of the crisis.
to the Crisis
Relations between the two states cooled off in the 1970s. This
was attributed to Iraq's occupation with the Kurdish rebellion and
disputes with Iran over Shatt Al-Arab. In the 1980s, the Kuwaiti
support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war contributed to a major
improvement in the relations between the two states. Kuwait made its
territory a strategic depth for the Iraqi military efforts. Iraqi
fighters and bombers were allowed to use Al-Ahmadi airbase, thus
threatening the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg from a safe haven.
Kuwait also allowed Iraq to build a pipeline that carried Iraqi oil,
through Kuwait, to the Saudi port of Yanbu at the Red Sea. This
allowed Iraq to continue exporting oil even when the Iranian troops
occupied parts of southern Iraq in the last stages of the war.
Moreover, Kuwait provided Iraq with $12 billion in loans to finance
its military and civilian purchases. Because of that support, the
Kuwaiti government expected that the Iraqi government would
reciprocate by demarcating the borders between the two states. The
Kuwaitis were encouraged after the Iraqi-Saudi agreement of
non-aggression and military assistance had been signed in March 1989.
Following the steps of King Fahd, the Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Ahmed,
went to Baghdad, in September 1989, to negotiate an agreement on the
borders but he failed.
The failure to reach an agreement
reflected the genuine differences between the Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations
and the Iraqi-Saudi relations. First, while there were Iraqi claims of
Kuwait, there were neither Iraqi claims of any Saudi territories nor
border disputes between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Second, the Iran-Iraq
war demonstrated the vulnerability of Iraq's access to the Gulf.
Therefore, after the war, the Iraqi government looked for expanding
that access by annexing or leasing the two Kuwaiti islands of Bubayan
and Warbah. Thus, when the Emir went to Baghdad asking for an Iraqi
recognition of the borders, he did not find a positive response.
Third, while Saudi financial support for Iraq during the war was
perceived and appreciated as a brotherly Arab nationalist duty, the
Kuwaiti support for Iraq was expected because of the special
historical relations between the two states. Finally, the Iraqis
argued throughout the war that they were not only defending Iraq but
also the entire Arab Gulf states. However, Kuwait was more threatened
than Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, particularly when the Iranian
troops became very close to Kuwait, during the last stage of the war.
The crisis started to deepen
following that failed mission of the Emir in Baghdad. While Saudi
Arabia commuted an essential part of its loans on Iraq to gifts,
Kuwait started to press for the repayment of the $12 billion of Iraqi
war debts. In response, Iraq began to criticize Kuwaiti overproduction
of oil that contributed to the 30 percent decline of oil prices,
reaching as low as $14 per barrel. In an Arab summit conference in
Amman in May 1990, the Iraqi President pointed that for every single
dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil, Iraq's loss would mount
to $1 billion a year. On July 16, 1990, the Iraqi foreign minister,
Tareq Aziz, reiterated these accusations in a letter to the
Secretary-General of the Arab League. In that letter, Iraq accused
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of overstepping the quotas of oil
production agreed upon by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC). The letter also accused Kuwait of stealing oil from
the Rumaila oilfield on the border between the two states. On July 20,
Iraq moved about 30,000 of its troops to the border, threatening
Kuwait. Several Arab leaders tried to mediate between the two
governments. These included President Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussain
of Jordan, Yasser Arafat of the PLO, and the Saudi foreign minister
Saud Al-Faisal. Their efforts succeeded in reaching an agreement
between the two sides to hold face-to-face talks in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. By the time the talks began on July 31, Iraq increased the
number of its troops on the border to about 100,000.
The crisis influenced the Geneva OPEC meeting on July 27. The
Iraqi strong position to stop the violation of quotas was supported by
most OPEC members, particularly Iran and Libya. The 13 OPEC oil
ministers decided that the price of oil would be increased by $3 to
reach $21 a barrel by the end of the year. In order to achieve that
price, they decided that production ceiling should not exceed 22.491
million barrels per day (bpd). Actually, the new ceiling was slightly
higher than the previous ceiling of 22.086 million bpd. The objective
was to accommodate demands from the United Arab Emirates to match
Kuwait's quota. However, the emphasis was on the strict observance of
the quotas, which was expected to take 800,000 bpd off the oil market,
allowing OPEC to achieve its target price by the end of the year.
The Iraqi delegation to the Jeddah
talks was headed by, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Izzat Ibrahim.
He presented four Iraqi demands on Kuwait to meet: abiding by OPEC
quotas, ceding the southern part of the border-Rumaila oilfield,
writing-off of the war debt, and compensation for oil market losses as
a result of the oil price decline. The Kuwaiti delegation, which was
headed by the Crown Prince Sa'ad Al-Abdallah, insisted on a
once-and-for-all settlement, that is, writing-off the debt in return
for border demarcation. The talks lasted less than two days ending
with disagreement on all issues early on August 1.
When the Jeddah Conference failed to solve the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
disputes, the stage was set for the invasion. The most important
historical development just before the invasion was from the United
States. The Bush administration made it known to the Iraqi leadership
that it was not going to interfere in inter-Arab disputes. The Iraqi
leadership might have understood that as the American “green
light” to go on with the invasion. Another factor was that Iraq
became more nervous of the possibility of an Israeli attack on its
nuclear installations. In addition, pressures on Iraq increased by the
Western demands for repayment of the war debts (Chapter VII).
The Kuwaiti military authorities
informed the country’s political leaders about the Iraqi military
build-up on the border and asked for declaring the state of emergency.
However, the political leaders did not take the Iraqi actions
seriously. They argued that Iraq was just trying to exert pressures on
Kuwait but would never invade the country as a whole. The worst
case-scenario, they imagined, was occupation of the disputed border
areas, mainly a strip of the Kuwaiti border near the Rumaila oilfields
together with the Bubayan and Warba islands. As a result, they did not
agree to declare the state of emergency demanded by the Kuwaiti
On July 31, 1990, there were five
Iraqi divisions (about 53,000 soldiers) ready to fight on the border,
under the leadership of General Iyad Al-Rawi. Some of the Iraqi troops
actually crossed the border as early as the afternoon of August 1,
1990 but tanks crossed at 10:30 p.m. They reached Al-Jahra town, 90
kilometers inside the Kuwaiti territory, by 2:00 a.m. of August 2. At
2:30 a.m., the Kuwaiti Chief-of-Staff, General Mizyid Al-Sani, signed
the emergency (readiness for fighting) orders but it was only at 5:00
a.m. when the first Kuwaiti unit became ready for fighting. While
General Al-Sani was signing his orders, the Emir and the Crown Prince
left to Saudi Arabia. The rest of the Kuwaiti government (cabinet
ministers) followed them at 3:40 a.m. The Iraqi military operation was
completed by occupying Al-Ahmedi airbase, south of Kuwait, by 10:30
p.m. of August 3. The isolated Kuwaiti military resistance continued
until August 4 (two days after the invasion), when the last Kuwaiti
military unit (the 15th Armored) surrendered.
By August 4, the Iraqi troops in
Kuwait increased to about 150,000. They completed the occupation of
the country in twenty-four hours and it took them twenty-four more
hours to end the Kuwaiti formal resistance. Thus, in spite of billions
of dollars spent on the Kuwaiti military establishment, it did not
demonstrate any serious resistance. Escape was in everyone's mind. At
one time, cars from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia were four abreast, 30
A Kuwaiti investigation, after the war, pointed to several
factors that may explain the poor Kuwaiti military performance. First,
the Kuwaiti army was not taken seriously by the political leadership.
Second, the military establishment lacked the necessary political
vision, training, equipment, and the right leadership. Third, the
Kuwaiti officers reported that the army was not trained for defending
the country against outside threats; rather, it was established for
internal security. Fourth, buying military equipment was subject to
the approval of civilian officials who cared more for their
commissions than for what was best for the armed forces. Fifth, the
armed forces suffered from a low morale, looseness, administrative
corruption, cliques, and nepotism (promotion on basis of kinship and
friendship ties, rather than competence). Sixth, while the officers
were mainly Kuwaiti citizens, about 80 percent of soldiers were
stateless residents of Kuwait, known as Bidoons ("without"
citizenship). It was absurd to expect a persecuted population group (Bidoons)
to defend its oppressors. Seventh, the military leaders were
inefficient and incapable to perform the least of their professional
duties and were completely dependent on the political leadership.
Eighth, the top military officials (the Defense Minister, the
Chief-of-Staff, and their deputies) were so ignorant about their
duties that they did not know what to do following the declaration of
military emergency. Finally, the political leadership left to Saudi
Arabia without appointing an alternative leadership to run the
to the Invasion
The United States and Britain were quick in their response to
the invasion. In just few hours, they led the United Nations Security
Council in adopting Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and
called for the Iraqi withdrawal. They also led European and Asian
countries in freezing all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets, in the same day.
The Arab response to the invasion was
different. The Arab League held an emergency meeting on August 2
without the adoption of any resolutions, waiting for results of King
Hussain's peace initiative. The Iraqi President called the King
earlier in the day suggesting a mini-summit to solve the problem. King
Hussain flew to Cairo to get President Mubarak's approval and the two
of them called President Bush asking for 48 hours to end the crisis.
President Bush did not waste any
time, particularly after he had been "admonished" by
Margaret Thathcher. The British Prime Minister, who had a
pre-scheduled meeting with President Bush, told him that this was no
time to go "wobbly."
He called King Fahd and offered U.S. aid if Iraqi troops did not stop
at the border. On August 3, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, sent a message to the Egyptian
Foreign Minister threatening that the United States may stop the
annual military assistance if Egypt did not take a firm stance on the
Kuwaiti issue. As a result, President Mubarak issued a statement
condemning the invasion.
On August 3, King Hussain announced
that Iraq agreed to start withdrawing troops from Kuwait on August 5.
However, later the same day, in another emergency meeting of the Arab
League, 14 Arab states followed Mubarak's lead in condemning Iraq and
calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The seven votes
against that resolution were from Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Libya,
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Sudan, and Yemen.
On August 4, President Bush called
King Fahd to warn him that Iraqi troops were massed along the Saudi
border. He offered sending Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, to
Riyadh for talks about defending Saudi Arabia. On August 6, King Fahd
agreed to receive American troops in his country, which became known
as Operation Desert Shield. In the same day, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 661 imposing economic sanctions on Iraq.
In response to the arrival of the
American troops in Saudi Arabia and to the U.N. economic sanctions,
Iraq declared a union of Iraq and Kuwait on August 9 (which was
altered to a formal annexation on August 28). On the same day, August
9, the Arab summit conference was held with 14 heads of states,
chairman of the PLO, and five government representatives. President
Mubarak forced a vote on a resolution that called for an Iraqi
withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the Emir. The resolution
also rejected annexation of Kuwait, supported the U.N. economic
sanctions, and called for the formation of an Arab "expeditionary
force" to aid Saudi Arabia. The vote on the resolution divided
the Arab states into three camps, one supporting Iraq, another
supporting Kuwait, and a third was neutral. The twelve votes in favor
of the resolution were those of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, and the
United Arab Emirates. The three votes against were those of Iraq,
Libya, and the PLO. The remaining six states were neither for nor
against. Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen abstained; Sudan and Mauritania
expressed reservations; while Tunisia was absent from the meeting.
The Iraqi invasion and the military rule of Kuwait that
extended between August 2, 1990 and February 24, 1991 led to
tremendous suffering among the inhabitants of Kuwait, citizens and
immigrants alike. About 300,000 Kuwaitis fled the country or did not
return after vacationing abroad. These included Al-Sabah ruling
family, the wealthy, prominent government figures, the military, and
security personnel and their families. They constituted more than 57
percent of the Kuwaiti citizens. Although most of them did not suffer
financially, they were devastated to discover their new status as
stateless and homeless refugees. Had their plight been extended to
years, they could have suffered the maltreatment stateless immigrants
receive in various countries.
About 250,000 Kuwaiti citizens stayed
in Kuwait together with about 240,000 Bidoons (stateless residents),
about 130,000 Palestinians, and several thousands of other
non-Kuwaitis. All these categories of the population suffered from the
crisis, the military rule, and the war. Kuwaiti citizens who stayed in
the country, though, received moral and financial assistance from
their government in-exile. However, scores of them were killed,
tortured, arrested, and detained without trial.
Extra judicial killings reached hundreds though many of the victims
were Bidoons, who were discriminated against before the crisis. Iraqis
also took several thousand men as prisoners of war, but the vast
majority of them were returned at the end of the war. By the year
2000, only about 600 men were still unaccounted for. In spite of the
few number of casualties and injuries among Kuwaiti citizens, they
suffered from a military rule that robbed them the freedom and the
luxurious lifestyle they enjoyed before the crisis.
More suffering was experienced by
non-Kuwaitis. This has been least reported on so far. About one
million immigrants of various nationalities were affected by the
invasion. Most of them had to leave the country, thus losing their
jobs in extraordinarily difficult circumstances. However, non-Kuawaitis
who stayed in the country suffered even more. These were mainly
Bidoons and Palestinians. They did not receive financial assistance
from the Kuwaiti government in-exile. Therefore, they had to report to
work during the Iraqi rule. This gave Kuwaitis the pretext they were
looking for to accuse them of collaboration with the Iraqi
authorities. Thus, from their safe havens abroad, Kuwaitis started
threatening the remaining Bidoons and Palestinians of retribution.
Inside the country, the Kuwaiti resistance targeted them with a number
of explosions that killed and injured many of them. The Iraqi
authorities required the Bidoons to join the militia otherwise they
would be arrested and jailed. When they tried to flee to Saudi Arabia,
they were not even allowed to enter the country, like Kuwaiti
citizens. They were trapped in a refugee camp on the border, near the
town of Khafjeh. After the war, the Bidoons, Palestinians, and other
Arab immigrants who stayed in Kuwait were subjected to a terror
campaign during which thousands were killed, injured, tortured, raped,
and detained without trial, as documented in Chapter X.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait may be more understood if it is
analyzed using the functional and conflict sociological perspectives.
From a functional perspective,
Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait was perceived by Western
leaders as a major dysfunction that led to the creation of an
imbalance not only in the Gulf region but also in the world as a
whole. The Iraqi action has created a state of disequilibrium in the
world order. Therefore, in order for the world to restore the
equilibrium, the Iraqi action had to be reversed. Thus, forcing Iraq
out of Kuwait would correct the dysfuction that occurred in the world
order. However, that was not enough, as it may not guarantee that Iraq
would not threaten the world order again in the future. Therefore, the
United States-led coalition adopted the destruction of Iraq as the
major goal that would also lead to forcing Iraq out of Kuwait.
President Bush was outspoken throughout the crisis in describing the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as a threat to the world order. General
Schwarzkopf, commander of the coalition forces, also mentioned that
the destruction of Iraq was a major goal of Desert Storm.
Viewing the crisis from an Iraqi functional perspective would
mean that the Iraqi invasion aimed at restoring stability to the world
order. In his July 17, 1990 speech, the Iraqi President attacked
rulers of Kuwait for damaging the Iraqi economy. He accused them of
illegally taking about $2.4 billion worth of Iraqi crude oil from the
Rumaila oil field on the border between the two states. He also
accused the Kuwaiti government of disrupting the status quo by
violating the OPEC quota system. By exceeding OPEC’s production
quota, Kuwait contributed to the dramatic decline of oil prices, which
Overproduction of oil led to lowering oil prices by 30 percent, from
$21 a barrel in January 1990 to $14 a barrel six months later. Iraq
was particularly hurt because it was in need for more money in order
to finance its development plans and reconstruction following the
eight years of war with Iran.
Thus, from an Iraqi functional viewpoint, it was Kuwait which
disrupted the status quo in the region and that the Iraqi invasion
aimed at restoring it.
It is clear that the functional analysis may justify both the
Iraqi action and the Western-led coalition's reaction. The major
shortcoming of this type of analysis is that it is ahistorical,
as it does not account for the historical development of the crisis.
To the contrary, the conflict
analysis accounts for history and attempts to uncover the real
interests of the parties involved in the conflict. This helps us
understand how the crisis developed and why Iraq was destroyed, as a
According to the conflict
perspective, the capitalist classes in the core industrial societies
as represented in this crisis by the United States, Britain, and
France perceived Iraq as a threat to their interests in the Gulf
region. Therefore, it had to be destroyed as a military and economic
regional power. Thus, the region has continued as an underdeveloped
periphery that exports its cheap energy to the core societies and
imports expensive manufactured commodities from them. Furthermore,
enabling Al-Sabah family to restore its rule of Kuwait has assured the
other regimes in the region that the core will continue protecting
them in the future. Finally, the destruction of Iraq removes away,
once and for all, a potential threat to Israel.
Contributing to the Crisis
By looking at the historical background of the conflict, six
main factors may be identified as major contributors to the 1990
Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis. First, the relations between the two Arab states
deteriorated after the Iraqi accusations that Kuwait had violated
production quotas, exploited the border-Rumaila oilfield unilaterally,
and demanded repayment of the war debts. Iraq needed more money not
only to rebuild its economy but also to repay its foreign debts. The
Western creditors started talking about an international consortium to
control the Iraqi treasury, which made Iraqis very nervous.
The second factor was represented by
the position of the Bush administration that encouraged Iraq to invade
Kuwait without worrying about any serious consequences. Throughout
1990, particularly during the climax of the crisis in July, the United
States never warned Iraq explicitly not to use force to settle its
disputes with Kuwait. When John Kelly, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern Affairs, visited Baghdad in February 1990, he
expressed the American indifference concerning the Iraqi-Kuwaiti
disputes. On July 24, 1990, the State Department spokeswoman, Margaret
Tutwiler, stressed that the U.S. had no defense treaty with Kuwait and
no special defense commitment to it. The same statement was reiterated
by John Kelly on July 31, 1990. These statements must undoubtedly have
encouraged Iraq to invade Kuwait.
More important, when Ambassador April
Glaspie met with the Iraqi President on July 25, she expressed the
same policy by telling him that the U.S. has “no opinion on
inter-Arab disputes, like your border dispute with Kuwait." In
fact, she was expressing the U.S official position from the dispute,
as she added that Secretary “James Baker has directed our official
spokesman to reemphasize this instruction.”
The Iraqi President was very much
interested to hear that statement and he had probably acted on it.
Like the United States, most Western European countries, particularly
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, supported Iraq throughout the
1980s in its war against Iran. Consequently, the Iraqis did not expect
a serious western opposition to their invasion of Kuwait.
The third factor that has contributed
to the crisis stemmed from the inter-Arab conflict that had polarized
the region for decades. Kuwait and Iraq stood in two rival camps in
the Arab Middle East. Iraq has portrayed itself as the socialist
defender of the deprived poor Arab masses, which aspire for an equal
distribution of the Arab oil wealth through genuine socio-economic
development in the region. Kuwait, on the other hand, has represented
the fortified castle of the privileged wealthy minority of Arabs who
invested most of their oil surplus wealth outside the region. Other
Arab regimes had to split as supporters for one of these positions or
the other. This has been one of the most serious issues in inter-Arab
politics. The wealthy oil-exporting Arab states argue that they have
suffered a history of deprivation and it is time now for them to enjoy
the oil wealth that God has given them. This means that the oil wealth
is theirs alone and they do not have to share it with the other Arab
states. That is why Kuwait has invested the vast majority of its
surplus wealth in the Western countries, rather than in the region.
Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, the Saudi
Commander of the 1990/1991 Arab coalition forces, testified to the
scarcity of resources before 1973. He mentioned that before "the
oil-price explosion of the 1970s, our financial resources were scant,
our manpower was unskilled, our society was still traditional, and we
had barely begun the process of modernization which, in the past two
decades, has put us ahead of most of our neighbors." When he came
to America to negotiate the Improved Hawk agreement in 1969, he and
his colleague, Muhammad El-Kayyal, had to pool resources in order to
buy a tape recorder. He wrote: "There was no money in the country
at that time and our pay was very low. I remember that we wanted to
buy a tape recorder, but could not afford it. Kayyal's grandmother had
tucked away some money to pay for her shroud. She gave it to us, and
we bought the tape recorder."
In order for Kuwaitis to limit oil wealth benefits to
themselves, they passed very strict citizenship laws that made it
almost impossible for immigrants to stay permanently or acquire
citizenship in the country. Therefore, the Kuwaiti demographic records
containing information about citizens became so precious that
smuggling them out of Kuwait to Bahrain after the invasion was a major
issue of concern to Kuwaitis and their supporters. Experts from
Bahrain, Holland, and France worked hard until they could break the
computer codes and recovered the Kuwaiti population statistics. Then,
the Kuwaiti government in-exile handed them over to the United Nations
as the only source that would decide who was a Kuwaiti citizen.
The Iraqi camp argues that the oil
wealth belongs to the Arab nation as a whole, not just to the
oil-exporting states. Consequently, it is unfair not to invest the oil
wealth in the region. After all, oil wealth could not have happened
without the oil embargo of 1973, which could have never happened
without the October War. Thus, while some Arabs were shedding their
blood, their brothers were filling their treasuries with money that
they did not want to share with them.
In spite of the fact that Iraq is an
oil-exporting state, its population of about nineteen million makes
Iraqi per capita income much less than that of Kuwait ($2,000/$16,900
in 1995). Another important factor is that the ruling party in Iraq,
the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party, represents the ideological antithesis
of the privileged status of members of the ruling family and citizens
The fourth factor that contributed to
the crisis was represented by border disputes. The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war showed that Iraq was vulnerable to the closing off of its only
commercial port, oil terminals, and naval bases at Umm Qasr, by Iran.
This simple geographical fact brought Iraq and Kuwait into conflict
since the independence of Kuwait in 1961. As a solution, Iraq was
looking for the acquisition of the two Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and
Warba. They separate the Iraqi territory, particularly Umm Qasr, from
the Gulf. Iraq offered to purchase, lease or exchange the islands for
fresh water but Kuwait resisted the offer (See the area map).
During the 1980s, when relations
between the two states improved, Iraq was allowed to utilize the
Kuwaiti territory to solve its geographical problems. A pipeline was
built to link Iraqi oilfields with the Saudi Red Sea port of Yanbu.
Moreover, a natural gas supply line from Iraq to Kuwait was completed.
In 1988, a technical and feasibility study was completed to supply
Kuwait with fresh water along a 290-kilometer pipeline from Al-Shattra
in southern Iraq.
Kuwait resisted the Iraqi attempts to
acquire the two islands by creating facts on the ground. It built a
bridge between Bubiyan and the mainland, constructed extensive
military facilities there, and paved a highway parallel to the borders
to link up all border posts. Directly after the ceasefire between Iran
and Iraq, Shaikh Sa'ad Al-Abdallah, Kuwait's Crown Prince and Prime
Minister, visited Iraq to negotiate the Iraqi recognition of Kuwait's
international border with Iraq, in return for forgiveness of the war
debt. However, Iraq expressed its recognition of Kuwait's entity but
did not recognize its boundaries.
The fifth factor that contributed to
the crisis was represented by the Iraqi fears of an imminent Israeli
attack on the country's nuclear and industrial installations. The
fears increased as a result of an increase in a smearing campaign
against Iraq. During the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) summit
conference in Amman, Jordan, on February 23, 1990, the Iraqi President
expressed his suspicion that Israel may attack the Iraqi nuclear
facilities during the coming five years.
On March 15, 1990, Farzod Bazoft, a
British journalist of an Iranian origin, was arrested as a spy in
Iraq. He was sentenced to death and executed. The incident increased
the Iraqi fears that Britain had joined the anti-Iraq campaign. On
March 22, 1990, Israeli agents assassinated Gerald Bull, the Canadian
builder of the Babylon Super-Gun, in Belgium.
Within a week, on March 28, 1990, the British arrested the Iraqi arms
dealer, Ali Daghir, who was free to do business during the 1980-88
Iran-Iraq War. He was arrested in London after signing papers of
receiving forty-one krytrons from the U.S. These were claimed to be
nuclear triggers imported for use in the Iraqi atomic bomb. Several
other arrests and deportations of Iraqis followed. The Iraqi
Ambassador to France, Abdul Razzaq Al-Hashimi, described these actions
by Britain, Israel, and the U.S. as a concerted effort to smear Iraq.
The objective of that public relations campaign was to justify another
attack on the Iraqi industrial installations, similar to that of 1981.
In a televised speech, the Iraqi President held an American-made
krytron in one hand and a pair of Iraqi krytrons in the other. He
demonstrated that Iraq did not need to import the American krytrons
because it had its own. Therefore, he argued, this fuss about them was
The sixth and the most important factor that contributed to the
crisis and the war was the adversarial Iraqi-Israeli relations. Iraq
has been perceived and portrayed as a threat to Israel. This may
explain why the Western powers opted for war, rather than peace
initiatives or even economic sanctions, to force Iraq out of Kuwait.
Tensions between Iraq and Israel
started during the 1948 war when the Iraqi forces played a major role
in keeping the West Bank as an Arab territory.
Tensions resurfaced in the early 1950s because of the Israeli campaign
to force the Iraqi Jews to immigrate to Israel. The new Israeli state
numbered only about half a million. Instead of trying to solve the
Palestinian refugee problem by repatriation and
compensation, as urged by the United Nations Organization, the Israeli
leaders started looking for Jewish immigrants to replace Palestinian
refugees. Strange as it was, the Israeli government planned and
executed a campaign of terrorizing Iraqi Jews in an attempt to force
them to immigrate to Israel. The campaign was so successful that most
Iraqi Jews left to Israel. However, the campaign contributed to more
tensions between Iraq and Israel. Between October 1951 and January
1952, the Iraqi government conducted three trials, in which
twenty-eight Jews and nine others were charged with espionage and
illegal possession of arms.
of the accused were also charged with the bombing and grenade attacks
on the Al Bayda coffee shop in Baghdad, in which four Jews were
injured in April 1950; on the Jewish emigrants' registration office at
the Mas'uda Shem-Tov synagogue, in which three Jews were killed in
January 1951; on the US Legation's information office in March 1951;
on a Jewish home in May 1951; and on a Jewish shop in June 1951. The
prosecution maintained that the aim of the attacks was to undermine
the regime, to give the regime a bad (anti-Semitic) name and to create
bad blood between Iraq and the Western powers. Some Iraqi Jews
maintained, then and for years afterwards, that the attacks on the
Jewish targets, especially on the Mas'uda Shem-Tov synagogue, were
organized by the Mossad and/or the Mossad LeAliya Bet in order to
persuade hesitant Iraqi Jews that it was in their interest to leave
their growingly anti-Semitic homeland and emigrate to Israel."
During the 1960s and the 1970s,
Israel supported the Kurdish rebellion (Chapter V). When the 1973 war
broke out, Iraqi air forces participated in fighting on both fronts.
However, most of the Iraqi participation was on the Syrian front.
These forces consisted of two armored divisions, with about 500 tanks,
700 armored personnel carriers, and 30,000 troops. These represented
three-fourths of the Iraqi air forces, two-thirds of the armored
forces, and one-fifth of the infantry units, at that time. The Iraqi
forces fought three major engagements on October 13, 16, and 19
against the Israeli XIX and XX brigades. These included joint attacks
with Syrian forces against the southern flank of the Israeli forces
with an Iraqi aerial support. The fighting resulted in heavy losses
(about 217 tanks) but could stall the Israeli momentum. This gave the
Syrian forces the chance to regroup and consolidate their defenses
west of Damascus.
In the 1980s, Israel worked hard to
lengthen the Iran-Iraq war in order to "sap the Iraqi military
capabilities," as the head of the Israeli military intelligence,
Amnon Shahak, said.
That goal was achieved through the Israeli arms sales to Iran during
that war, which contributed to more tensions between Israel and Iraq.
Not only the Israelis supplied the Iranians with Israeli military
equipment but also persuaded the American administration to do so in
what became known later as the Iran-Contra affair.
When the war ended with most of the Iraqi weapons intact, the Israelis
were nervous and wanted to see Iraq destroyed.
As a major Western ally during the Cold War, Israel was capable
of earning the Western support for its policy towards the Palestinian
people and the Arab states that supported them. Israel continued its
denial of the Palestinian national and political rights recognized by
the United Nations. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly
passed the partition Resolution No. 181, which called for the creation
of the Arab state of Palestine besides the Jewish state of Israel. In
1949, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution No. 191,
which demanded that Israel solve the Palestinian refugee problem by
compensation and repatriation. However, Israel refused to observe
these United Nations resolutions.
Moreover, it continued its expansionist policies by occupying more
Arab territories in 1956 (Sinai and Gaza Strip). Israel also adopted
more aggressive and expansionist policies, such as launching
pre-emptive strikes against any Arab state that may threaten the
Israeli policies. It was in this context that Israel launched the 1967
war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor
in 1981, and invaded Lebanon in 1982. Israel could not do that without
the continuous Western military and economic support.
Thus, ending the Iraqi invasion by
force, rather than by peaceful initiatives or economic sanctions,
aimed at maintaining the Israeli military superiority. The destruction
of the Iraqi military capabilities was a goal in itself and a golden
opportunity to guarantee the Israeli military superiority in the
region, for decades to come.
the Israeli Military Superiority
The West has made sure that Israel has a technological edge in
the Middle East by enabling it to develop its own arsenal of nuclear
weapons. On October 5, 1986, the Sunday Times of London published an
article based on information supplied by Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli
Jew of a Moroccan origin and a former technician at the Israeli Dimona
Nuclear Research Center. Vanunu's evidence showed that Israel produced
between 100 and 200 nuclear weapons of various destructive forces,
thus becoming the world's sixth nuclear power.
By the end of the Iran-Iraq in 1988,
several Israeli leaders started to describe Iraq as a threat to Israel
because of its missile and chemical weapons capabilities.
The smearing campaign continued for the following two years until one
day, on April 2, 1990, the Iraqi president was so provoked that he
threatened to burn half of Israel if it attacked Iraq again.
He was referring to the unprovoked 1981 Israeli attack on the Iraqi
nuclear plant. The 1991 Gulf War showed that destroying the Iraqi
nuclear facilities was a major goal of the air campaign. Actually, the
Iraqi nuclear facilities were destroyed during the first week of the
war. In fact, in the largest single raid of the air campaign, 56-F16s
(out of the total 251 American F-16s) attacked the Iraqi Nuclear
Research Center in Baghdad on January 19.
Clearly, this was the major Israeli target, which had nothing to do
with forcing Iraq out of Kuwait.
Iraqi Nuclear Programs became
advanced enough to threaten the Israeli nuclear superiority. That was
why Israel decided to destroy the Iraqi programs. On June 13, 1980,
Israeli agents killed the Egyptian nuclear physicist, Yahya Al-Mashad,
in Paris for his work in the Iraqi nuclear program in France.
On June 7, 1981, Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor (Tammuz I)
in two waves of attacks by its American-made F-16 aircrafts. However,
Iraq was capable of rebuilding its nuclear facilities (Tammuz II)
throughout the 1980s. In September 1988, as evidence that production
of nuclear weapons was soon to happen, Iraq sought to buy nuclear
triggering devices, called krytrons. By June 1990, Pentagon analysts
estimated that Iraq was somewhere between two and five years to have
its first atomic bomb.
Israel also succeeded in destroying
another Iraqi weapon, the Babylon Super Gun, which was about to allow
Iraq to reach the space age. In March 1989, the Iraqi 56-meter long
super gun was completed and tested. Each one of its steel shells could
carry about 500 kilograms of high explosives, for a distance of about
1,000 kilometers. On February 7, 1990, General Amer Al-Sa'adi
announced that Iraq was ready to use the Babylon Super-Gun in
launching two versions of domestically produced satellites into space.
During April and May of 1990, an
all-Europe campaign was launched to complete what Israel started when
its agents assassinated Gerald Bull, the father of the Babylon Super
Gun, on February 7, 1990. Customs officials in Britain, West Germany,
Italy, Greece, and Turkey intercepted shipments to Iraq that included
parts that may be used in making the Super-Gun. During July 1990, the
U.S. officials intercepted shipment of parts, which were to be used in
making the Iraqi nuclear bomb.
Finally, Israel was much interested
in destroying the Iraqi missile systems in order to maintain its air
supremacy in the region. The Iraqi missile program was active and
successful, as early as 1984, when Iraq developed the ballistic
missile Astros II in collaboration with Brazil.
The program was soon accelerated when Iraqis obtained 300 Scud-B
missiles in 1986. The Iraqis took them to Brazil, where they were
converted into 200 medium-range missiles with reduced warhead
capacity, 190 kilograms instead of 800 kilograms.
On August 5, 1987, the Iraqi President announced that the Iraqi
missile, Al-Hussain, was test-fired, flew 615 kilometers, and landed
in the designated target area.
On December 7, 1989, Iraq launched
its three-stage, 48-ton rocket, which stood 25 meters high.
"Al-Abed" was capable of carrying a military warhead at a
target some 2,000 kilometers away. The U.S. officials did not like
this Iraqi achievement. The following day, December 8, 1989, they told
reporters in Washington that Iraq's missile programs had become a
"subject of major concern to the Bush administration.
On April 12, 1990, the Iraqi
President reiterated the Iraqi contention that there was an
unjustified Western media campaign against Iraq. He told a delegation
of American Senators, headed by Bob Dole and Alan Simpson, that if he
and the Iraqi High Command were killed in an Israeli attack, the Iraqi
air force commanders would fire chemical weapons against Israel. He
also defended the possession of strategic weapons as a balance of
power that would keep peace with Israel, which already had its own
with American Jewish Leaders
Sensing the coming danger, Iraqis tried hard to communicate their concerns to American Jewish leaders and supporters of Israel in the Congress. At the beginning, the Iraqi efforts seemed working, particularly in the 1988-1989 period. However, by the beginning of 1990, tensions escalated towards the crisis. By April, the American policy towards Iraq started to change dramatically, as explained in Chapter VII.
Before the 1990 crisis, the Iraqi
Ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, tried to earn support
of the American Jewish and pro-Israel leaders for Iraq. With help from
Marshall Wiley of the State Department, he would invite them to a
dinner in his residence to persuade them that Iraq did not pose a
threat to Israel.
The American Jewish leaders and supporters of Israel in the Congress,
such as Stephen (Steve) Solarz and Alfonso D'Amato, demonstrated that
they were interested in his argument by visiting Iraq and meeting with
top officials of the Iraqi government, including the President.
However, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the same
members of the Congress became among the major instigators against
Iraq, describing the Iraqi President as Hitler.
Hamdoon's policy of earning support
of the Jewish and pro-Israel leaders was so successful that Kissenger
and Associates sent representatives to the forum of the American
companies in Baghdad, in 1989. The forum wanted to influence the
administration to help Iraq solve the debt problem. Later, these
associates (Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger) became top
officials in the Bush administration.
The first agreement to reschedule the Iraqi debt was going to
be signed in Paris on August 4, 1990.
On February 13, 1990, Richard Murphy arrived at Baghdad as a
representative of Robert Abboud, the head of the U.S.-Iraq Business
Forum and Chairman of the First City Bank Corporation of Texas.
Hamdoon was also successful in inviting several Jewish leaders to his
residence. Once, he was capable of assembling a group of the most
influential Jewish and pro-Israel leaders.
were Steve Solarz, the Jewish Congressman from New York; Peter Rodman,
the head of policy Planning at the State Department; Howard Teicher,
the top Middle East analyst at the National Security Council; Robert
Pelletreau, the Deputy Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South
Asian Affairs; Alfred H. Moses, a former liaison to the Jewish
community during the Carter administration; Judith Kipper, a Middle
East specialist at the Brookings Institution; and three prominent
journalists: Ken Wollack, coordinator of the Middle East Policy
Survey; Don Oberdorfer, of the Washington Post; and David Ignatius of
the Wall Street Journal.
Relations between Iraq and Kuwait were tense throughout the
twentieth century. However, tensions increased during the five main
crises of 1901, 1902, 1938, 1961, and 1990. Only the last crisis
escalated to an Iraqi invasion.
Iraqis felt that the Kuwaiti
government ignored their grievances concerning oil prices, war debts,
and border disputes. They expected a much better treatment from their
brotherly neighbors. In particular, they argued that they defended
Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war. In return, they expected appreciation
and economic support after the war, which they did not get.
Kuwaitis also had their own
grievances. They demanded an Iraqi recognition of the border between
the two states. When the Iraqis did not agree, they retaliated by
exerting economic pressure on them. They demanded repayment of the $12
billion war debt. Moreover, they increased their oil production quota,
thus contributing to the 30 percent decline in the oil prices. Feeling
these economic pressures, the Iraqis escalated the dispute by sending
troops to the border. When the Arab-mediated Jeddah conference failed
to resolve the disputes, the stage was set for the Iraqi invasion.
The Arab initial reaction to the
invasion was a mixture of shock and disbelief. Therefore, it took the
form of peaceful initiatives demanding the Iraqi withdrawal. However,
the tough Anglo-American position in the United Nations led the Arab
League to the condemnation of the invasion and the demand of instant
Iraqi withdrawal. The turning point was when King Fahd agreed to
receive American troops in his country. That was the first step
towards the eviction of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the destruction
of Iraq during the war.
The Iraqi invasion and the war that
followed led to tremendous suffering among millions of people in the
Middle East, particularly in Kuwait and Iraq. Most Kuwaiti citizens
became refugees in the Gulf area and around the world. Kuwaitis and
non-Kuwaitis who stayed in Kuwait suffered the most. In particular,
Palestinians were reduced from the largest immigrant group in the
country numbering over 450,000 before the invasion to about 130,000
during the crisis and less than 30,000 after the war. They lost their
jobs, investments, and the society that they established for more than
half a century. They were also subjected to a terror campaign after
the war that aimed at evicting them from the country. The Bedoons were
the second non-Kuwaiti population group to suffer at the end of the
war. Kuwaitis persecuted both Palestinians and Bedoons for their
alleged collaboration with the Iraqi authorities (Chapter X).
Nevertheless, the Iraqi people have been suffering the most: hundreds
of thousands of Iraqi soldiers were killed and injured, their country
was destroyed, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children died after
the war, as a result of the embargo.
Using the functionalist analysis to
understand the 1990 crisis is very simplistic. The crisis did not
start with the Iraqi invasion, which would not escalate into the 1991
war without a host of other factors. The conflict analysis is much
more helpful in understanding the historical, regional, and
international factors that deepened the crisis to reach the level of
an international conflict.
The immediate factors that contributed to the crisis were war
debts, the decline in oil prices, and border disputes. However, the
crisis represented a historical split between two conflicting Arab
camps that polarized the Middle East for decades. Western powers also
contributed to the crisis by not making their positions clear to Iraq.
The United States officials expressed the opinion that they were not
going to interfere in inter-Arab disputes. Israel played a major role
in escalating the crisis. First, Iraqis began to fear an imminent
Israeli attack on their nuclear installations. Second, a media
campaign followed all over Europe and North America to smear Iraq
because of the Iraqi counter-threats against Israel. Then, European
countries started intercepting industrial shipments purchased by Iraq
for fear that these shipments may be used in making the Babylon
Super-Gun that may threaten the Israeli military superiority in the
Middle East. Third, Israeli agents assassinated the Canadian Gerald
Bull who built the Super-Gun.
The 1990 Iraqi-Kuwaiti disputes were serious enough to reach a crisis stage that ended with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. However, these disputes alone could not have escalated into the 1991 Gulf War without a host of regional and international factors. Peaceful initiatives for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait were not given a fair chance. Economic sanctions were not given a chance either (Chapter VIII). War was the preferred solution for the crisis. Why? This is explained in Chapter VII: America Goes to War.
 Graz (1990).
 Graz (1990; Daneshku (1990); Salinger and Laurent (1991: 31).
 Jaber (1990); Pimlott (1992: 40); Bin Sultan (1995:
158-59); Al-Yahya (1993: 84, 113).
 Kuwait National Assembly (1995).
 Al-Yahya (1993: 85).
Kuwait National Assembly (1995).
The change in the U.S. position from indifference towards inter-Arab
disputes to a strong stance against the invasion is discussed in
 Bin Sultan (1995: 183-84); Pimlott (1992: 41-46); Salinger
Laurent (1991: 90-113).
 Amnesty International (1990).
MEW (1991); HRW (1995).
 The functional perspective is most concerned with preserving the status quo. The ideal state of affairs is the balance between major social institutions or between centers of power in society, or between various societies, as in this case. If social institutions are in harmony with one-another, they will be more capable to perform their unique functions in society. This results in social stability as represented by an equilibrium. However, when one of these institutions starts dysfunctioning or contradicting with other institutions, society suffers from a state of disequilibrium or imbalance that threatens the social order and social stability. At that time, society as a whole should work in a concerted effort in order to restore the state of equilibrium by removing the conditions that have led to that dysfunctioning. Talcot Parsons (1951; 1955) and Robert Merton (1965; 1986) were pioneers in sythesizing this perspective. A recent synthesis may be found in Alexander and Colomy (1990).
 Schwarzkopf (1992).
 Amnesty International (1990: 4).
 Bin Sultan (1995: 158).
Robertson (1987: 17).
The conflict perspective emphasizes that there is an inherent
conflict of interests in society between the capitalist class and
the working class. All other social groups in society may be
involved in conflict, too. These may include religious, racial,
ethnic, regional, gender, age, and consumer groups. All compete for
major resources of society, particularly wealth, power, and
prestige. Among the prominent contemporary conflict theorists are C.
Wright Mills (1956), Erik Olin Wright (1985), and William Domhoff
(1990; 1998). Andre Gunder Frank (1967; 1972) and Immanual
Wallerstein (1974) added a global dimension to the conflict
perspective by pointing to the global capitalist competition for
markets and raw materials, as mentioned in Chapter V.
 The first agreement to reschedule the Iraqi debt was going to be signed in Paris on August 4, 1990 (Timmerman, 1991: 347-49, 389). However, the Iraqi leaders were concerned regarding the Western intentions of imposing a financial regime on Iraq similar to that imposed on Egypt in the 1870s, which led to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882.
Bin Sultan (1995: 162); Pimlott (1992: 39).
 The text of the meeting in its entirety is published in Sciolino (1991: 271-284). In her March 20, 1991 testimony in Congress, Ambassador April Glaspie said that she also warned the Iraqi President not to use violence against Kuwait by telling him: “But we insist that you settle your disputes with Kuwait nonviolently” (Sciolino, 1991: 280, 283). However, on July 12, 1991, Senators Claiborne Pell and Alan Cranston said that “Ms. Glaspie’s cables to the State Department after her meeting with Saddam suggest that she never issued a tough warning to the Iraqi President.” Mr. Cranston went further, charging that “Ms. Glaspie deliberately misled the Congress about her role in the Persian Gulf tragedy” (The Atlanta Journal/Atlanta Constitution, July 13, 1991).
 Bin Sultan (1955: 77-78).
 Bin Sultan (1995: 251).
 EIU, The Economist Intelligence Unit, (1990: 48-51).
 EIU, The Economist Intelligence Unit (1990: 48-51).
 Pimlott (1992: 37).
Timmerman (1991: 373-79).
The commander of the Jordanian forces in East Jerusalem during the
1948 War, Abdullah Al-Tal, mentioned that Golda Meir convinced King
Abdullah of Jordan to persuade his relatives, rulers of Iraq, to
withdraw the Iraqi troops from their strongholds in Galilee and the
Triangle (Palestine). In return, Israel would allow him to keep the
West Bank under his control. The Iraqi forces withdrew from their
positions without fighting, which resulted in the easy loss of Led (Lod)
and Ramleh Arab areas. However, their withdrawal contributed to
keeping the rest of the West Bank as an Arab territory (Al-Tal,
 Black and Morris (1991: 91).
 Black and Morris (1991: 313-314); McKnight (1992: 23);
Al-Bazzaz (1989: 135, 141-42).
Al-Bazzaz (1989: 143-44).
The operation was headed by the previous Israeli military attache in
Iran, Ya'akov Nimrodi. He was assisted by the American-Jewish
businessman who founded the Israeli aircraft industries, Al
Schwimmer, the Saudi multimillionare Adnan Khashoggi, and the
Iranian arms dealer Mansoor (Manucher) Khorbanifar. Leaders of the
Israeli national-unity government, Prime Minister Peres and Foreign
Minister Shamir, approved of it. As a result of an agreement between
the Israeli director-general of the Foreign Ministry, David Kimche,
and the American National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, Iran
received ninety-six American-made anti-tank TOW missiles at the end
of August 1985. Three weeks later, a further 408 missiles were
delivered by the Israelis to the Iranians with the American approval
and the Saudi financing. After that, the Israeli-American support
for Iran was handled by Amiram Nir, the Advisor for the Israeli
Prime Minister, and Oliver North, the deputy for the U.S. National
Security Advisor. Several other arms deliveries were made to Tehran.
The affair started to be uncovered when Nir suggested to North that
the Iranians be overcharged for the weapons and that the surplus
cash be secretly diverted to the Contra rebels fighting the
Sandanista regime in Nicaragua. The idea sounded great for North
because it would serve the agenda of President Reagan, whose
policies in Central America were crippled by the predominantly
Democratic Congress. Thus, North broke the Congressional law of
stopping aid to the Contra rebels, which brought the whole operation
into questioning by the Congress (Black and Morris, 1991: 427-433).
The degree of Israeli involvement is evident in the amounts of the
sales. Between 1980 and 1986, Israeli arms sales to Iran amounted to
about $2 billion. The media took notice of the affair when two
Israeli generals were arrested in Panama in relation to their
contacts with the Contras. This affair has demonstrated that the
United States had subjected its policies in the Middle East to
Israeli interests. The U.S. policy was ending the war through
passing the UN Security Council Resolution 598. However, the Reagan
administration contradicted with its own policy and followed the
Israeli policy by approving the arms sales to Iran (Al-Bazzaz, 1989:
 Elnajjar (1993).
 Black and Morris (1991: 437).
 Reich (1990).
 Pimlott (1992: 37).
 Bin Sultan (1995: 343).
 Timmerman (1991: 69-70).
 Timmerman (1991: 69-70).
 Timmerman (1991: 322, 370-371).
 Timmerman (1991: 377-379, 387-388).
 (Timmerman (1991: 184).
Timmerman (1991: 248-249).
Timmerman (1991: 267). However, McKnight (1992: 175) mentioned that
Al-Hussain had a range of 650 kilometers with a payload of 250
kilograms of explosives.
 Timmerman (1991: 365-366).
 Timmerman (1991: 379-382).
 Timmerman (1991: 222).
 Timmerman (1991: 347-349).
 Timmerman (1991: 389).
 Timmerman (1991: 219-223).
Table of Contents, Gulf War: Overreaction & Excessiveness, By Hassan A El-Najjar